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ПОД- СЕКЦИЯ 3. Политические технологии. PR.



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**СОЦИАЛЬНО-ПСИХОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ МЕТОДЫ ВЕДЕНИЯ
ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНОЙ КАМПАНИИ
(НА ПРИМЕРЕ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНОЙ КАМПАНИИ Е.Р. УРЛАШОВА НА ПОСТ
МЭРА ГОРОДА ЯРОСЛАВЛЯ В 2012 ГОДУ)**

В современном мире с распространением демократических ценностей в политическом управлении все большую роль играют социально-психологические методы..

Залогом грамотного проведения политической кампании является учитывание особенностей объекта политического управления, его системы взглядов, восприятий, ценностные ориентаций, возможного поведения в той или иной ситуации, социальных и иных потребностей. На этой основе необходимо выстраивать свои тактические действия для получения субъектом управления необходимого результата.

Кроме того, социально-психологические методы политического управления, относятся к категории постоянно развивающихся и находящихся в развитии методов. В связи с этим необходимо проводить все больше исследований для того, что бы учитывать их особенности при составлении суждений о политической реальности.

Объектом исследования являются методы и средства ведения избирательной кампании. Предметом - формы и способы реализации социально-психологических методов ведения избирательной кампании Е.Р. Урлашова на пост мэра г. Ярославля в 2012г.

Цель исследования: изучить применение социально-психологических методов политической борьбы в ходе кампании Е.Р. Урлашова на пост мэра в г. Ярославле в 2012 году.

Задачи:

1) определить позиции, ресурсы основных субъектов избирательной кампании Е.Р. Урлашова в политическом пространстве;

2) изучить агитационные материалы Е.Р. Урлашова на предмет отражения в них социально значимых потребностей жителей г. Ярославля;

3) спрогнозировать дальнейшее использование социально-психологических методов в будущих избирательных кампаниях в г. Ярославле.

В ходе исследования применялись следующие методы:

1) Ситуационный анализ. Данным методом мы определяем стартовые позиции субъектов избирательной кампании в политическом пространстве на момент начала выборов. Данным методом проводится анализ проведения избирательной кампании Е.Р. Урлашова. С помощью ситуационного анализа выявляются основные потребности жителей города Ярославля, проанализированы настроения и тенденции, существующие в данном обществе и определены позиции кандидата в политическом пространстве.

2) Дискурс-анализ. Применяется в работе для определения основных тем, проблем на которые делается акцент в агитационных материалах Е.Р. Урлашова, с целью воздействия на электорат.

Лингвистический анализ включает в себя 3 измерения – текст (речь, письмо, визуальное изображение), дискурсивную практику (способ производства и восприятия текстов), и социальную практику (способ использования текста)[4, с. 45].

Наше исследование направлено на выявление дискурсов на основании которых создан текст, и в каких ситуациях данные дискурсы применяются. Также на выявление технологий производства текста, особенностей его интерпретации аудиторией. Необходимо определить, как в тексте используются метафоры, жесты, фразеостроение, грамматика.

Дискурс анализ применяем к программе Е.Р. Урлашова, взятой с его сайта [7], плакатов, информационных вестников, приглашений на встречу.

3) Прогнозирование. Данный метод применяется для того чтобы спрогнозировать дальнейшее применение социально-психологических методов ведения избирательной кампании в г. Ярославле в среднесрочный период. Прогнозирование применяется для определения уровня использования социально-психологических методов ведения избирательной кампании в г. Ярославле в среднесрочный период (5-10 лет). Прогнозирование выполняется с помощью матрицы смежности по следующим факторам:

1) Развитие демократии; 2) Рост гражданской активности; 3) Появление специалистов в области ведения предвыборной кампании кандидата; 4) Развитие технологий ведения избирательных кампаний; 5) Эффективность применения социально-психологических методов в кампании Е.Р. Урлашова; 6) Зарубежный и федеральный опыт; 7) Развитие исследовательских центров (социологических, маркетинговых); 8) Развитие политического консалтинга 9) Применение административных методов вызывает протестные настроения; 10) Нехватка знаний и опыта для применения данных методов.

Затем устанавливаются закономерности, делаются выводы, с помощью которых выбирается наиболее вероятный путь развития на «дереве вариантов путей развития».

В ходе исследования было выявлено следующее. В политическом управлении выделяют административно-распорядительные, экономические и социально-психологические методы. На практике эти методы обычно не применяются изолировано друг от друга, но в определенных сферах каждый из этих методов

является доминирующим. Применение методов на практике должно соответствовать существующему законодательству.

При применении социально-психологических методов для достижения необходимого политическому субъекту управления результата нужно учитывать особенности, специфику, потребности объекта, на которого направленно воздействие, среду в которой он находится. В данной сфере в настоящее время широко применяются манипуляции, также к основным способам реализации социально-психологических методов относятся пропаганда, PR-технологии, имидж, социальная рекламы, политическая реклама, информационная война.

К основным особенностям общественно-политической ситуации в городе Ярославлю можно отнести: негативное отношение к власти как на региональном, так и на федеральном уровнях, для жителей города гораздо важнее решение проблем неполитического характера (дороги, детские сады, ЖКХ), и желание обновлений в городе [6].

В ходе избирательной кампании Е.Р. Урлашова социально-психологические методы ведения избирательной кампании были применены при:

1) построении имиджа: В регионе было желание перемен, не любовь к действующей власти, проблемы с дорогами и детскими садами как наиболее необходимые и важные, а затем создание имиджа отвечающего всем этим требованиям – молодой активный человек, противостоящий власти, готовый к изменениям, и позиционирующий решение основных социально-значимых проблем,

2) при противостоянии компромату и помехам основного противника. Урлашову путем резких нападок на власть в самом начале кампании удалось вызвать, что называется, «огонь на себя», был выстроен образ борца радеющего за народ. В результате раскрутка Урлашова прошла практически за счет ресурсов кандидата действующей власти, т.е. за счет Якушева. Любые действия власти в противовес Урлашову лишь усиливали этот образ, придав ему ореол пострадавшего за правду. Обыски, попытки скомпрометировать, снять кандидата воспринимались в основном в пользу Евгения Робертовича.

3) при применении слов-ярлыков к своему основному противнику. В Ярославле, как в принципе во всей России, не любят олигархов, существует стереотип в массовом сознании, что значит, этот человек наворовал в 90-е годы, олигархи воспринимаются однозначно негативно. Ярлык ставленника власти также имел сильные негативные последствия, так как, как уже говорилось выше, в Ярославле устали от существующей власти и правящая партия оценивается отрицательным отношением.

4) при создании своей политической рекламы. Лозунгами на его баннерах, плакатах были «Верну город людям», «Против жуликов и воров», «Вернем детские сады детям», что в полной мере отвечало потребностям и социальным настроениям, существующим в обществе, благодаря этим плакатам его образ положительно воспринимался жителями города Ярославля.

5) Вел грамотную агитационную кампанию, которую в основном строил на встречах во дворах с избирателями. Граждане города хотят видеть в качестве мэра «своего человека», «человека из народа». С помощью этих встреч он и создавал данный образ.

Итак, в ходе избирательной кампании Евгения Урлашова широко применялись социально-психологические методы политической борьбы. Команда основного противника недооценила эффективность таких методов, и зачастую не учитывала особенности восприятия, ценностные ориентации, особенности массового сознания граждан города Ярославля, тогда как команда Урлашова успешно использовала их на протяжении всей избирательной кампании.

В ходе прогнозирования было выявлено следующее. Распространение демократических ценностей влияет на форму ведения избирательных кампаний, требуются более тонкие и гибкие методы воздействия на население, прямые и грубые оказались менее эффективными в условиях города, что показала избирательная кампания на пост мэра города Ярославля в 2012 году. Этот опыт может подтолкнуть развитие в области применения социально-психологических методов ведения избирательных кампаний, будут появляться новые специалисты со знаниями технологий и форм ведения кампаний из зарубежного опыта или опыта федеральных кампаний, с применением социологических и маркетинговых исследований.

Итак, в связи со всем выше сказанным можно сделать следующие выводы. Все большее распространение в политической практике получают социально-психологические методы политического управления. Их применение может привести к искажению социальной реальности в сознании граждан. Крайние формы подобных методов, такие как манипуляции, черный пиар могут привести к снижению политической культуры избирателей России, мешать развитию демократии.

Для данных методов очень трудно разработать различные защитные механизмы. Но необходимо знать о существовании таких технологий, иметь их в виду в процессе организации избирательного процесса, а с позиции избирателя уметь дифференцировать источники информации, стремится различать реальное и выдаваемое за реальное, моделируя собственное восприятие происходящих событий.

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**“PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA IN THE DIGITAL AGE AND POLITICAL INTERNET
IN UKRAINE DURING THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 2012”**

Law on public service broadcasting in Ukraine adopted in 1997 (author - Vitaliy Shevchenko), but it has not been enacted. Discussions on the creation of public broadcasting revived in 2005 - after the Orange Revolution. In 2010 MPs Shevchenko Kaskiv and Suslov registered another version of the bill “On public service broadcasting” (№ 7241). The bill awaits consideration in the first reading.

Public broadcasting remains Ukraine’s commitments to the Council of Europe, has publicly supported by all political players, and experts and NGO representatives unanimously recognize it urgently necessary. However, the term of its formation remains uncertain. However, the last time there are thoughts that the creation of public broadcasting is becoming irrelevant in the electronic era. More and more people get their information from the Internet. Young people do not use information from the traditional media. Creating public broadcasting requires huge financial investments, so society itself begins very skeptical refer to such projects. Increasingly, experts and politicians believe that it is necessary to create public service broadcasting and public web resources in Internet. Moreover, the political struggle is increasingly moving to the Internet. Last parliamentary elections in Ukraine showed this trend.

The usage of Internet technology as a tool of political struggle is not new to any of the political actors who are taking part in any election campaign.

After the Orange Revolution, which marked though chaotic, but rather colored attempts of their applying, the global network with each successive election campaign turned into an increasingly attractive platform for political agitation and discrediting opponents. Finally, it was promoted by a number of factors.

While traditional media, especially television, still remained the main and sometimes crucial source of mass consciousness manipulating, popularization of the Internet in society, the relative cheapness of its usage for political purposes, instantaneity and scope of coverage, along with a characteristic of many of the old guard politicians desire to keep up with the times despite absolute unwillingness and inability for modernity, simply could not pass unnoticed. With the ever increasing pressure from the authorities, namely the Internet environment has become the personification of liberty, free discourse, substantive dialogue and almost a single space system of criticism of the regime.

Moreover, along with the increasingly popular social networks, namely the Internet-media for the opposition is not the exclusive opportunity to prove to the public their own perspective on the events and processes that unfold in the country. It is impossible not to note ever increasing amount of active Internet users in Ukraine.

Thus, according to the conclusions published by InternetWorldStats in 2011, Ukraine became one of the dominant ten European countries by the number of users. And this is for

adults only. Moreover, in Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine indicator of 15.3 million has given up only to Russia and Poland. However, according to the latest data of regular market research of telecommunication services performed by GfK Ukraine, by the end of 2011 the number of regular Internet users in Ukraine has reached 33%. This positive trend is evident among all age groups, except for the population older than 60 years. That is a sharp increase of online presence of the economically active population - the average voter, in other words.

At the same time, 77% of home computers have the network connection. Four of five Ukrainian users call their home as a primary point of the access to the internet. What does it mean? At least that while using network in their free time, people not only fall less under the influence of television and printed media, but also provide their choice and form ideas about the world around exactly on the basis of information obtained from the Internet. The temptation to use such resources and obtain necessary votes for getting into parliament is too big.

Official websites

Availability of official websites for Ukrainian politicians - is common.

And if the private domain of single politicians – is a trend of the past two or three years, the majority of Ukrainian political parties have long passed the time when the official web site was created rather in an effort to follow the “fashion” than to ensure adequate public awareness about their own activity on the network.

Nowadays this tool is actively used by even more archaic Communist Party, and the lack of its own page on the Internet is regarded by many as one of the direct signs of flippancy of any organizational structure. At the same time, preferably this kind of resources as a source of unbiased and accurate information is not perceived. Already according to a good tradition, every self-respecting party should have its own web-site. Ukraine is not an exception.

On parties Web sites one can find a variety of information: from regulations and party program to bank accounts for charitable contributions in party funds. Famous Ukrainian politicians also have personal websites that serve as a peculiar platform for existing and potential supporters of a leader.

Function of parties' websites generally should be ideological, that is formulating the basic activities of the party. Personal pages of politicians have strictly branding loads.

As a tribute to fashion, politics start their own blog: whether on specialized resource, or, for example, on websites of popular online publications.

The level of trust of users to blogging, in fact, is quite high. Some politics are very active bloggers, such as Anatoliy Gritsenko and Mikhailo Brodskiy, as they admit in numerous interviews. However, including employment and other factors, not every politician has time / desire / opportunity to own his own blog. Therefore it is natural that blogs can be a collective team product.

Blogs have several advantages: the ability to easily publish information, the lack of any spatial and temporal restrictions to find the recipient of the information. Their main function is to promptly bring to the user politician's position on a certain issue. After all, this is another way to post compromising materials on someone. As there are cases when posts on blogs became a pretext for lawsuits.

Affiliated websites

As a result, political actors are increasingly seeking to gain opportunity to directly

or indirectly influence the editorial policy of Internet sites, apparently not directly linked to any political forces. Recognizable and quite popular among users of online portals have become a tidbit in the political game. Especially characteristic of this trend is in regions where financial resources are usually rather limited and threat of getting politically hooked is much higher.

Therefore, even today some media for financial fusions are trying to create for local politicians with big ambitions image of moral authorities, public opinion leaders and advocates for the rights of citizens, trying to show them as good business executives, philanthropists and just decent people. Ukraine has practically no neutral news resources. However, their number is currently very high. As at the national level, there are about five dickers of information resources that have at least some impact on the electorate. At the regional level, the situation is somewhat different. In most areas the number of news websites does not exceed 5-10, however, for example in the Odessa region there are about two dickers of news sites that shape the agenda in the region. Most portals have their owners, who in their turn have certain political preferences. Unlike traditional media, there are more opposition Web resources.

Moreover through controlled Internet resources often occurs “drain” of compromising facts or misinformation that “legitimate” the emergence of such information in traditional media, removing the responsibility for its veracity. There are two opposing views on the effectiveness of this technology. Some experts argue that over time they lose their effectiveness because traditional media already have experience of work with these sites and are rather cautious about the information posted on them. Their opponents are convinced that, due to the expanding Internet audience, such disinformation will not require the mediation of traditional media, and will spread by means of “stuffing” on specialized forums or through social networks by users of World Wide Web.

Rather often, site owners, including political, use such technology when through fictitious visitors they manage to reach the first positions in the online rankings. This is possible using the system “promotion” or click-clubs where the owner of the resource buys in an organization transitions (visitors) to his website, and special programs that allow you to mask events from the same IP address, giving the impression of different actions visitors. It was for a “promotion” visits at rating of portal bigmir.net that the Party of Regions site was deleted. This technology was used massively by candidates-majority who created the image of a famous politician, the activities of which is allegedly observed by the large number of people.

Social Networks

An integral part of modern political positioning is also having their own pages on social networks. A new standard here have become Facebook, Twitter and LiveJournal. Preferably youth-oriented are “Odnoklassniki” and “Vkontakte”.

As for Ukrainian politicians, among the general public they still continue to think mainly by quantity and not quality. Thus, according to the number of “Friends” the most popular bloggers of the country are Yulia Tymoshenko, Natalia Korolevska, Sergiy Tihipko and Mykola Azarov. Moreover, according to recent statements by the prime minister, in the near future all the leaders of the officials in the voluntary-involuntary force will have to get their own account. However, among those who keeps the pages himself, can be distinguished MPs Andriy Shevchenko, Oles Doniy, Vladimir Aryeva, Lesia Orobets, Andrew Pishniy

and others. On the ground, this list is much more abundant. For many social networks are indeed space for debates, discussions and idea generation.

Social networks create the illusion of openness and publicity, leading to competitive images, manipulated which is sometimes even easier than in the case of TV. Moreover, in most cases, pages are maintained directly by the owners, not by representatives of press service. As Prime Minister often conducts online discussion with readers of his page, a lot of news that appear in the Ukrainian segment of the Internet are generated after applications from members of Parliament which they leave on their profiles.

Internet voting

Another way to manipulate public opinion in elections prism became various opinion polls and ratings. With their help, users could join, and at the same time learn the names of the most decent, popular, most opposition and the right candidates.

For this purpose entire websites were created. And if some, such as “Candidate 2012” allowed picking among a cohort of politicians, others, for example local polityk.if.ua, mostly pushed and provoked. Moreover quite often on the Internet appeared the results of polls conducted by unqualified organizations, that were designed to generate the population thought that the election in a particular region a certain candidate is leading. On these elections, this technology was used rather often, and apparently led to cheating the public about the real state of the election race.

“Trolls”

This segment as a political technology is widely used by political actors for a long time. Quite frequent are occurrences when for an individual the whole teams are working, whose main task is to neutralize certain information through comments, to discredit opponents or, conversely, to whiten their own employer.

Politicians are trying to create illusion of popularity and to reduce competitor rating with the help of hired commentators and bloggers (so called Internet-Trolls).

In most PR-agencies for money one can order support with comments. This method has become a full part of the majority of PR-campaigns. However, the press services of Ukrainian politicians assure that they do not use this method.

The fight for the favor of the electorate is not limited to real life and continues on the Internet. In order to influence the minds of people, politicians are trying to create the illusion that the community supports them and does not like their opponents. To this special people are attracted, who provoke debates and defend a particular point of view on popular websites, forums and blogs. Usually these paid commentators, so-called Internet trolls, write on the rating network resources. So in some sources one can find information about 100 hired bloggers across the country, who worked for one political force.

Another method of “killing” news is pollution of comments unrelated to the topic of messages material - “flood.” Such techniques reduce the attention and activity of users: very few people would be willing to look for the person or the information in the notes, which are a mess.

One of the ways to deal with “trolls” is an authorization by identification through some social networks, e.g. Facebook. However, this practice is not yet sufficiently developed, and therefore often comments under articles, especially on popular in the country websites become competitive.

Along with this, as experienced politicians have learned to accept this kind of “Dirt”

quite restrained, and ordinary readers do not give them much weight at all, in the regions, as practice shows, these are far more wounds, bringing to their staffs special persons who would be responsible for the work in this direction.

Moreover, Russia has created a special program that automatically generates and leaves a comment under the news, in which there are “key words (names of politicians, party names)”. Comments naturally are provocative, or vice versa, praise somehow political actors mentioned in the article.

Organization of hacker attacks.

The distinguishing feature of elections in 2012, Ukraine has become a virtual unfair competition of political forces that resulted in the frequent cases of hacking websites of opponents (minimum cost of hacker attack on rival site is about 5 thousand dollars) or organization of DDos-attack, which costs several thousand dollars per one day of locking resource. During August and September 2012 victims of hacker attacks became pages of united opposition “Batkivshchina”, Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and almost all the candidates majority who had although the slightest chance to win. So in the Odessa region profile of councilor candidate to Verkhovna Rada Igor Markov, who incidentally won in his constituency, was hacked. After hacking, hackers created a new online resource, which began to publish correspondence of councilor candidate. Obviously, the correspondence was filled with provocative materials, own views on the opponents’ power, government and country as a whole. Moreover correspondence contained indications that there are organizations whose objectives are subversion of existing political order, and supporters of such thoughts are some well-known politicians. However, we can assume that politicians can arbitrarily declare virtual attacks to draw attention to their political power and to charge competitors to use unfair methods;

Also very popular technology in this election was the substitution of websites, which establishes websites-“doubles” (with a similar web address, or the same design, but opposite, parody content). Often staffs of politicians used Google Boombing, when a particular query search system produces absurd or provocative result. This technology was first applied in Ukraine in 2004, when the Google search engine on the request “a thief should sit in jail” primarily published reference to the personal site of V. Yanukovych. And on election in 2010 in response to the query “end of the country” Google published address of the site of Yulia Tymoshenko. In parliamentary elections in 2012, similar techniques were used to particularly all major political parties and candidates.

However, despite the relatively wide use of the Internet in the parliamentary election campaign in 2012 the majority of candidates and parties had no strategy of positioning themselves in the network. Modern websites were created, large variety of services was ordered, work of many people was paid, but basic principle of communication networks - two-way communication was not complied.

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**CHALLENGES AND THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF UKRAINE
AND THEIR COMPARISON WITH SECURITY FUNCTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND NATO IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS POSITIONING IN THE SECURITY
DIMENSION OF GEOPOLITICAL SPACE IN EUROPE**

Statement of the problem. Taking into consideration that Ukraine fails to fully ensure the protection of the state against external threats and challenges on its own in terms of globalization and Ukraine's interest in membership in the EU and NATO, the research on neutralizing threats and challenges to national security with security mechanisms and instruments of the above mentioned international organizations appears to be rather actual. In the legal aspect of conceptual issues regarding this issue became entrenched in the Law of Ukraine "On National Security of Ukraine" dated June 19, 2003 № 964 - IV.

Analysis of recent sources and publications. The theory of the European Union and NATO formation and development has been developed by Western scholars R. Asmus, J. Burton, J. Bull, J. Goldhair, K. Waltz, M. Wight, S. Walt, D. Yost, G. Pridham, A. Carter, H. Kissinger, W. Perry, J. Stainbrunger, etc.

European security issue is revealed in the works of such Ukrainian scholars as T. Berezovets, K. White, V. Vdovenko, J. Honchar, O. Delinsky, O. Paliy, etc.

Challenges and threats to the national security of Ukraine were studied by I. Binko, O. Bodruk, A. Goncharenko, V. Gorbulin, O. Danilyan, A. Kachynskiy, V. Kosevtsov, V. Lipkan, V. Muntiyany, N. Nyzhnyk, S. Pyrozhkov, G. Perepelytsya, G. Pocheptsov, Y. Rymarenko, G. Sytnyk, etc.

Among Russian researchers one should name Y. Bazhanov, T. Bordachev, Y. Borko, O. Bursov, O. Butorina, D. Danilov, S. Karaganov, I. Maksymychev, etc.

Many works are devoted to the subject of relations between Ukraine and the EU and NATO in the security sphere, which considers cooperation and involvement of Ukraine in various security application programs. The issue on comparing the challenges and threats

to the national security of Ukraine with security features of the European Union and NATO is regarded as unsolved part of the general problem. And it is this juxtaposition that will further contribute to determining priority of Ukraine's integration into these security structures.

The purpose of this paper is to study and identify the main challenges and threats to the national security of Ukraine and their comparison with security features of the European Union and NATO.

According to the author's point of view factors that formed a threat to the security of Ukraine, can be divided into two groups: external (geopolitical, foreign policy, foreign economic) and internal (domestic political, domestic economic).

Geopolitical factors. Ukrainian geopolitics is determined by three main vectors of foreign policy interactions that determine the configuration of historical priorities of the country. This is Eurasian, European and South Eastern direction which form the relevant foreign policy paradigms of thinking. They have very deep historical roots and are determined by a number of geopolitical factors indicating its objectivity and importance to the state.

To distinguish the main sources of destabilization of the geopolitical situation is appropriate for further determination of the threats to the national security of Ukraine within the framework of the above mentioned factors. These sources include the possible territorial claims, encroachment on national and territorial integrity of the country, local wars and armed conflicts, especially near the Ukrainian borders (Transnistrian conflict), the national economy instability and the impact on the economic interests of the state, especially in the energy sector, interference in the state's internal affairs, separatism (possible in Crimea and eastern Ukraine) [2].

The geopolitical situation is determined by the following factors: the formation and strengthening of regional centers of power; escalation of local wars and armed conflicts [1].

Foreign economic factor is to be considered in the perspective of four key tendencies coming from the main directions of the foreign policy of Ukraine and its interest in joining the collective security system.

First tendency is the intensification of relations with NATO, evidenced by the ongoing dialogue between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, other governmental and non-governmental organizations with official institutions of the Euro-Atlantic alliance, numerous informal meetings at various levels and, consequently, a large-scale NATO military drill in the Ukrainian landfills in the Black Sea, and partially participation of the Ukrainian armed forces within NATO troops in military conflicts that arise in Europe.

The second trend is manifested in the form of active participation of Ukraine in the formation of a new European security system. Global geopolitical changes in the world and Europe have strengthened the role of such integrated association, as the European Union. One of the main assets of this new vector is European Integration – EU Common Security and Defense Policy.

Today the European Union is developing regional security cooperation around the borders of the EU, especially eastern ones. Therefore, the third trend in the European and Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations of Ukraine is regional cooperation, which primarily includes active security and defense cooperation with members and candidates for membership of the EU and NATO. It is quite possible to regulate conflicts jointly with

the EU on the former Soviet Union space, particularly in Transnistria [4].

Taking into consideration the strategy of cooperation between Ukraine and the EU in the field of security, the fourth tendency, Ukraine's interest for the development of peacekeeping, is considered really perspective, that is supported by extensive experience and high reputation of Ukrainian peacekeepers gained during the settlement of conflicts within the framework of UN and OSCE, as well as a close strategic relationship with NATO.

Foreign economic factor. Recently there has been a tendency to deteriorate the state of foreign trade due to the global economic crisis. Industrial sector, export-oriented metallurgical industry, mechanical engineering have appeared to be the most vulnerable. Not only the global market demand for products decreases, but prices as well. Ukraine has been influenced in the same way: industrial enterprises are forced to cut production of export products, which inevitably leads to a deterioration in domestic economic situation in the country and threatens national security. The negative trend is the decline in foreign investment in key sectors of the economy of Ukraine. Recently, the cases when large foreign companies take their share of the total investment market have become more frequent. Dependence on Russia to supply gas and energy may further increase the probability of manifestation of external threats to national security, directly associated with Russia.

It is also important to analyze the second group of factors that reflect the situation in the country.

Domestic political factor may lead to further negative consequences such as hindering the process of Ukraine's integration into the EU and NATO, the deterioration of relations with Russia, the destabilization of the economy, the increasing complexity for the Parliament and other governmental agencies to pass immediate and strategic decisions that in its turn may pose a threat to national security.

Domestic economic factor is manifested in escalating economic crisis in the issue of political and global economic crisis. Now the crisis lead to the reduction of production enterprises, deterioration of the investment climate, a monetary and financial crisis, the destabilization of the financial system and, consequently, increasing unemployment and poverty, decline in the level of wages, etc. There is a growing trend towards loss of state military strength. Economic instability and, consequently, the reduction of public charges for defense leads to a decrease in production in the domestic military-industrial complex and financing of the military sector changed for the worse, which inevitably affects the defense capabilities of the state and presents a threat to national security.

The next step of the classification of threats to national security is their distribution according to the criterion principle using the deductive method. Classification is mainly based on the list of threats, contained in Art. 7 of the Law of Ukraine "On National Security of Ukraine" [3].

Threats are divided according to the degree of formation into real and potential.

Real threats include: encroachment on state sovereignty of Ukraine and its territorial integrity, claimed by other states; manifestations of separatism and attempts to gain autonomy based on the ethnic features in separate regions of Ukraine; threat to the democratic system; illegal immigration; a dangerous reduction of military and special equipment and arms of new generation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations that threatens their combat effectiveness; political crisis; domestic economic crisis; the global economic crisis; slow implementation and lack of financial support of

reform programs of the Military organization and military-industrial complex of Ukraine, etc. To the real threat one may include the overthrow of the constitutional order, which directly threatens the development of democratic processes in the country, democracy in general; epidemics prevention (HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, etc.).

Potential threats include: attempts of other states to interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine; military and political instability, regional and local wars (conflicts) in different regions of the world, the possibility of Ukraine's involvement in regional armed conflicts or in conflicts with other states; attempts of other states near the borders of Ukraine to increase military troops and weapons that violate the balance of power; increase in the share of foreign capital in strategic sectors of the economy that threatens the economic independence of Ukraine; incompleteness of legal registration and the lack of improvement of the state border of Ukraine; the possibility of conflict outbreak in inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations; irrational structure of exports mostly with raw nature and a low proportion of products with high added value. Potential threats also include threats to the social, humanitarian, scientific, environmental and information fields.

After a detailed classification of the major threats to the national security of Ukraine the author considers appropriately to compare the major threats to the functions of the EU and NATO.

The EU's main function is to fight with "soft threats" using "soft power." "Soft threats" to the European Union security include illegal immigration, terrorism, transnational organized crime and epidemics prevention. The main security functions comprise a comprehensive security strengthening of the EU; peace-keeping and strengthening of international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; the development of international cooperation; development of democracy and the rule of law; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; the protection of common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. Taking onto consideration the range of threats to the national security of Ukraine illegal immigration (real external threat), the fight epidemics prevention (real internal threat) are considered common threats with the EU.

Let us compare threats to the national security of Ukraine with security functions of the EU. The following threats may be neutralized in the case of Ukraine's accession to the European Union through the "soft power" and security features of the latter:

- in the realm of foreign policy: encroachment on state sovereignty of Ukraine and its territorial integrity (due to the protection of internal and external borders); attempts of other countries to interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine (due to constant maintenance of the security of member countries against threats from the outside), a risk to become a buffer ("gray") zone (due to intensification of integration processes with subsequent accession to the European Union), the destruction of the country's sovereignty and reduction of political independence (due to the protection of common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the member countries), the possibility of aggression, annexation or military occupation (threat to the territorial integrity) - protection of internal and external borders, operational reacting function (timely response to all manifestations of aggression outside and quick action to its elimination);

- in the realm of national security: attacks on democratic system (can be removed

by the general organizational security function - development of democracy and the rule of law in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter), the threat of overthrowing the constitutional order (can be eliminated by the general organizational security function - protection of common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of member countries), manifestations of separatism and attempts to gain autonomy based on the ethnic features in separate regions of Ukraine (these two threats can be neutralized by an internal security function of the EU, which is to create a favorable security environment for member countries);

- in the realm of military and security of the state border: illegal immigration (the threat coincides with “soft threat” to the EU security and can be eliminated by strengthening and protecting the internal and external borders), the possibility of Ukraine’s involvement in regional armed conflict or confrontation with other states (can be neutralized through continuous maintenance of security defense for member countries against threats from outside); attempts of other states near the borders of Ukraine to increase military troops and weapons that violate the balance of power (can be neutralized by the supervisory and security functions (security maintenance from external manifestations of aggression), incompleteness of legal registration and the lack of improvement of the state border of Ukraine (can be neutralized by the total strengthen policy for all EU member countries and ongoing monitoring of cross-border activity);

- in the realm of domestic politics: the deepening of regional differences based on political and geopolitical orientation (can be neutralized by the EU internal functions – creation of a favorable security environment for the Member States and the general organizational security function – protection of the integrity of member countries in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter); internal political crisis (may be neutralized by the “soft power” of the EU, based on “common European values”, which include the maintenance of political stability among member countries); threat to overthrow the constitutional order, which directly threatens the development of democratic processes in the country, and democracy in general (can be neutralized by the “soft power” of the EU, based on “common European values”, which include the maintenance and development of democracy and democratic governance); the possibility of conflict outbreak in inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations (can be neutralized by the EU internal security functions, which is to create a favorable security environment for member countries), structural and functional imbalance in the political system of society, the inability of its parts to respond quickly to threats to national security (can be removed through “soft strength” of the EU, based on “common European values”, which include maintaining political stability of member countries);

- in the realm of economy: internal economic crisis; derogation of state regulation and control in the realm of economy; the critical dependence of the national economy from external markets, slow expansion of the domestic market; irrational structure of exports mostly with raw nature and a low proportion of products with high added value; high debt’s dependence of the state, critical amounts of public external and domestic debts, “shadowness” of the national economy.

The author offers to match threats to security of Ukraine with NATO’s security functions. The main obligations of NATO is providing “hard security” and territorial integrity of member states and responding to global security challenges. Taking into consideration

NATO's basic organizational functions, the main areas where NATO can neutralize threats to national security are: foreign policy, national security, military and border security.

Foreign policy. After Ukraine's accession to NATO such threats as the possibility of aggression, annexation or military occupation (territorial integrity threat) and encroachment on territorial integrity can be eliminated with deterrence and defense function by means of deterring and defending against any form of aggression directed against any NATO member country in accordance with Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. Another threat - the danger to become a buffer ("gray") zone (can be eliminated by a more active integration process with subsequent accession to NATO). The destruction of the country's sovereignty and reduction of political independence can be neutralized through a consultative and political functions. According to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, NATO is the transatlantic forum for joint consultation on any matters affecting the vital interests of its members. Political function is manifested to ensure the development of democratic institutions and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

In the realm of *national security* threats can be divided into real and potential. Real threats include weakening of the democratic regime in the country; the potential threats involve encroachment of the constitutional order. These threats can be neutralized through a consultative function, which is manifested in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, and function, which consists in the development and dissemination of democratic values in the world.

Military and security of the state border is the most important realm, where NATO, unlike the European Union, will play a major role in neutralizing threats to national security after Ukraine's accession, because no other security organization in the whole world has NATO's military instruments and mechanisms. To eliminate the threats in this area NATO uses the security functions of the Alliance institutions, which secured a clear mandate and principles.

Conclusions. Hence, the main threats for the European Union are "soft threats" because the EU is developing mechanisms and tools to them and prevents them using "soft power." Priority areas where the EU can neutralize threats to national security in the case of Ukraine's integration into the Union include: foreign policy, national security, military and security state borders, internal political, economic. Economic realm is the main sector, because the EU has powerful economic instruments to implement its policies and counteract the threats actively in this area. Counteraction to threats in foreign policy, public security, defense and security of the state border is mainly conducted with NATO, because the latter has a stronger military and financial potential, but NATO with the EU create a powerful defensive shield to counter threats from the outside. Safety in the internal politics and health care is provided by the EU through its own maintenance and development of democracy and democratic processes. All security functions underpin the EU functions of its institutions, which help counteract threats by providing guidance in a particular area. A policy of integration of Ukraine into the EU seemed to gain a primary importance not only from economic but also from security point of view (it may protect against internal and external threats).

The key areas where NATO can provide and guarantee the safety in case of Ukraine's accession, is foreign policy, national security, military and security state border. NATO can use powerful military instruments and tools, as well as adequate financial base to fully counteract

outside threats that violate Ukraine's national security. The key is a military and security state border. Thoroughness of forms and methods of neutralizing military threats enables the organization to respond and take action to eliminate the threat. Internal political, energy, environmental, scientific and technical realms belong to the secondary areas. Versatility of security mechanisms allows NATO to counteract threats in these areas due to its institutions, developing appropriate solutions and make recommendations for neutralization of certain threats. Weakness and imperfection of mechanisms and instruments does not allow NATO to counteract threats actively in economic area. Therefore, after accession to NATO, Ukraine is guaranteed to get a reliable security protection and defense against threats from outside, especially in the military sphere.

The European Union and NATO create the so-called "European Security Shield", which ensures and provides security condition for European countries, as well as help to counteract and neutralize different threats. Analysis and detailed comparison of threats to national security of Ukraine with the EU and NATO functions shows that Ukraine will provide a reliable "security and defense shield" after its accession to the European Union and NATO.

The concrete measures and appropriate state program on cooperation in the field of national security and Ukraine's integration to the above mentioned structures may be submitted to further consideration as a result of clear distribution of responsibilities for the threats and challenges to national security of Ukraine between the European Union and NATO.

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